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THE CONSERVATIVE PROGRAM FOR THE WELFARE-WARFARE STATE: THE RESPONSE TO THE
KOREAN, ALGERIAN, AND VIETNAMESE WARS
Clarence Y.H. Lo, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley
introduction
Limited wars after World War II have produced a right rather than a left turn
in the politics of the industrially advanced countries. During the Korean War, the
Republican party articulated the Popular discontent about the war and captured the
Presidency in 1952. Perhaps it is no surprise that the Korean War, accompanied by
McCarthyism and MacArthur's demands for escalation, should lead to eight years of
Eisenhower conservatism. Vietnam, however, created a strong left wing mobilization
against the war; it is less obvious why Nixon was elected immzdiately afterwards.
De Gaulle, another conservative, followed the French involvement in Algeria, which
produced protests from both left and extreme right that brought France to the brink
of a military coup and civil war.
This paper explains why the leaders of conservative political parties were so
successful in the aftermith of limited wars. Conservative parties are those parties
whose constituency is large and small business, managers, upper income professionals,
and some white collar workers and farmers, exemplified by the Republican Party in
the United States, the Gaullist Party in France, the Christian Democrats in Germany
and Italy, and the Conservative Party in England. Conservative political leaders
rose to power because they addressed the problems intensified by limited wars--
budget deficits, political stalemate, and inter-imperialist rivalries-- and, to
some extent, enacted short term solutions--budget cuts, leadership above politics,
and increasing national power.
The first section of the paper describes how budget deficits grew in limited
wars because of increases in military spending, heightened opposition to taxes,
and, in the case of the Vietnam War, increasing social spending to keep domestic
order. Conservatives appealed to the mounting popular concern with inflation and
proposed budget cuts. Part two argues that limited war also worsened the problem
of political stalemate, the inability of any group or coalition to mobilize suffi-
cient pDpular support to implement a coherent program. During the Korean War, the
conflict bdtween the Democrats' limited war aims and the Republicans' victory strat-
egy intensified the already bitter conflict between the new deal and anti new deal
coalitions. The Algerian War made the political stalemate of the Fourth French
Republic a complete breakdown. The conservative response to political stalemate
was the national hero-Generals Eisenhower and de Gaulle--who offered to govern the
country without the deadlock of conflicting popular demands and ineffective poli-
ticians. Defeat in a limited war gave conservatives the opportunity to claim that
they would increase national power. Eisenhower promised an affirmative policy of
liberating the communist nations instead of merely trying to contain them, and
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threatened massive retaliation at times and places thatbe would choose, rather than
responding to communist initiatives. Nixon continued to use the rhetoric of
increasing national power, but at t] e same time, sought to increase the U.S. stand-
ing in the world economy. Afte, the Algerian War, de Gaulle also made French power
a theme, through the rhetoric of grandeur, challenges to the U.S. position in the
international monetary system, and increases in the French military budget.
The specific policies of budget cuts, leadership above politics, and national
power reflect values which have been long associated with conservative politics.
The conservative suspicion of state action and reform is reiterated in the program
of budget cuts following limited wars; the conservative acceptance of inequality
finds new life in the demands for reductions in government programs for the poor
and disadvantaged. The calls Icr leadership above politics echo elitist suspi-
cions about letting popular pressures determine government actions. National power,
too, has been a long standing theme of conseriatives. Despite the connections be-
twcen the policies after limited wars and conservative traditions, it would be a
mistake to portray the policies as the logical outcome of a consistent conservative
theory. Conservatism has undergone dramatic changes throughout history. Most re-
cently, as we shall see, the conservatives de Gaulle and Nixon vastly expanded the
powers of the high levels of the executive branch of the national government, and
used that power to accomplish major changes in policy. This "executive conserva-
tism," is at odds with a major conservative tradition--the distrust of active
government, and new policy departures, in favor of an equilibrium in government
based on checks and balances.
1
The flexibility of conservative doctrine is nothing new. Throughout history,
while conservative principles have remained, specific positions on broad issues
such as industrialization, democracy, and the state have often completely reversed.
The constituencies supporting conservative views have also dramatically changed.
In the early stages of industrial capitalism, the social base of conservatism
was landed and commercial wealth, which was seeking to resist the demands of the
newly emerging industrial capitalists, workers, farmers, and artisans for equality
and participation in absolutist governments. The conservatives of this period,
who can be termed "traditional conservatives," not only were skeptical of main-
taining order by concessions to the mob; they also doubted the industrial capi-
talists' claim that markets would control the labor force and insure popular com-
pliance the face of continuing inequality and privilege.2 Traditional conserva-
tism favored the maintenance of social order by strengthening forms of community
that had stabilized feudal society: the church, the family, the military, the
small village, and other groups where hierarchies were maintained by customary
deference and obligation. Traditional conservatism survives in the recent work of
Nisbet (1976).
By the end of the nineteenth century in the United States, a particular vari-
ant of conservatism arose as industrial capitalists became the major constituency
articulating the conservative principles of preserving property, privilege, and
tradition. Laissez faire, rather than feudal notions of community, became conser-
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vatism's major theme. American conservatism borrowed the liberal tradition of
markets, rationalism, and individualism. Conservatives also made use of democratic
rhetoric, although they continued to bitterly resist all popular attempts at re-
form and participation. (Rossiter, 1962: 128-62) Thus, the inconsistencies and
flexibility of the conservative doctrine have allowed it to survive through vastly
different historical periods. After the Korean, Algerian and Vietnam wars, conser-
vative policies not only managed merely to survive. Conservatism was highly re-
levant in the crisis situation of the limited war and provided short run solutions
that prevented intensification of the crisis.
Our view that conservatives can effectively respond to crisis, generate a
consensus among elite factions, and gain popular assent for the policies, is a
needed supplement to the prevailing view among new left historians. These writers
have stressed the ability of the "corporate liberals" to accomplish new policy
departures. While conservatives see popular movements as a threat to stability
and order and hence are unwilling to make any concessions to them, corporate li-
berals become involved in the issues raised by popular movements and are more
tolerant of reforms. Despite the corporate liberals' rhetorical acceptance of the
goals of popular reform movements, the actual aim of the corporate liberals, ac-
cording to new left historians, is to stabilize the capitalist system. For example,
Kolko (1963: 255-78) contends that the "Progressive" Era reforms such as regula-
tion of corporations and the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission increased
the growth of large firms at the expense of smaller ones. 3 Corporate liberals in
the National Civic Federation favored the recognition of moderate labor unions
which would institutionalize class conflict without threatening the capitalist sys-
tem. (Weinstein, 1968: 3-39) Bernstein (1967: 263-82) argues that the New Deal
expansion of social spending prevented the intensification of popular discon-
tent and provided business with expanded markets and a safeguard against deep re-
cessions. Corporate liberal support helped blacks to reduce political and legal
inequality. Thus, the civil rights movement was conciliated, and also, from the
point of view of capital, the U.S. gained a more favorable image through the third
world, where communist propaganda had effectively criticized the condition of U.S.
blacks. Since new left historians see corporate liberalism as the long run inter-
est of the capitalist class, conservatives, who opposed government regulation of
corporations, the recognition of trade unions, and the welfare state, therefore
also oppose capitalists' class interests, even though, ironically, the conservative
position was the majority view of the business community at that time.
Although in the Progressive Era and the Great Depression, conservative opposi-
tion to reform was dysfunctional for capitalism, after limited wars, conservative
remedies became more relevant. This interpretation differs from the "power shift"
theory (Sale, 1973, 1975; Oglesby, 1973) which also attempts to explain the recent
conservatism of politicians, government policies, intellectuals, and public opinion.
According to the power shift theory, the owners and managers of the multinational
corporations headquartered in the East continue to be corporate liberal. However,
they are no longer dominant economically; they have been out-shined by the fast
growing industries of the South and Southwest, which support conservative politics.
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The sun belt's rising economic power is matched by rising political power of the
conservatives. However, our analysis contends that the conservative revival does
not result from a power shift from the eastern to the southern factions of the
capitalist class. Multinational eastern business is still the dominant faction
of the business community. On many issues, they are shifting from a corporate
liberal to an executive conservative position because the interest of the capital-
ist class as a whole has shifted to the right.
Our methodology is to first consider the general outlines of the crisis of
late capitalism: the fiscal crisis of the state, political stalemate, and shift-
ing inter-imperialist rivalries. These three problems have been intensified by
limited wars. Right wing politicians have taken the lead in identifying the prob-
lems, but have often presented a distorted analysis, calling for budget cuts, lea-
dership above politics, and increasing national power. Despite the inaccuracies
of their analysis, conservative politicians have succeeded in using these issues
to win sweeping electoral victories near the end of each limited war.
Shifting attention from political campaigning, we next study how the Eisen-
hower, de Gaulle, and Nixon administrations dealt with the three problems. De Gaulle
and Nixon, unlike Eisenhower, handled the problems by greatly strengthening the
executive branch of the national government.
The specific details of conservative response will vary from nation to na-
tion, depending on past history of the country, its place in the world economy,
and its culture; no one case will exemplify all of the features of the conserva-
tive ideal type. Thus, the 1968 Nixon campaign placed relatively little emphasis
on breaking a political stalemate. Reductions in government spending, the major
campaign theme of the two Republicans, was not an important reason for de Gaulle's
popularity. Nevertheless, in the long run, no administration could ignore the
issues of budget cuts, stalemate, and national power.
In focusing on the conservative alternative to the crisis of late capitalism,
we are not implicitly arguing that this alternative is in any way inevitable. Con-
servatism is not a long-run solution to the problems of capitalism. The fiscal
crisis, political stalemate, and the destabilizing effect of inter-imperialist
rivalries can be attacked through a wide variety of solutions, social democratic
and fascist as well as conservative. The conclusion examines the potentialities
and weaknesses of the other alternatives, and discusses the options available to
the left.
We first consider how developments in late capitalism strengthened the con-
servative positions on budget cuts and leadership above politics. After briefly
indicating some of the general causes of crisis in late capitalism, we will de-
scribe the intensification of crisis by limited wars and the response of conser-
vative politicians.
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Budget Cuts and Leadership Above Politics
O'Connor (1973a) has argued that the development of monopoly capitalism de-
pends on growing state budgets, which has resulted in inflation and the fiscal cri-
sis of the state. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, high military spending and
the demands of interest groups intensified the problems of inflation and fiscal
crisis, which became successful campaign themes for both Eisenhower and Nixon.
4
In the beginning of the Korean War, the fiscal crisis was latent. The initial
popularity of the war produced an almost universal consensus for raising taxes; in
the war's first year the federal budget had earned a 16.4 billion dollar surplus.
However, military spending continued to soar, mainly propelled not by the fighting
in Korea but by an ambitious program to rearm Western Europe and other U.S. allies
against the Soviet Union. As the war entered its second stalemated year, popular
opposition to taxes increased (Lo, 1976). Although compared to World War II, mili-
tary spending in the Korean War was less, a higher percentage of it was paid
through taxes instead of public sales of savings bonds. Tax rates approached
World War II levels, and in the case of single individuals, were higher than in World
War II.5 A reluctant Congress would approve only self expiring, rather than
permanent tax increases. President Truman's proposed budget for fiscal 1953 showed
a deficit of $10.4 billion.6 Pressures from labor unions, farmers, and business
succeeded in weakening the government's wage, price, and credit controls, threaten-
ing a new round of inflation, which heightened the need for budget cuts.
During the Vietnam War as well, the concessions to interest groups combined
with the costs of war to produce intense inflationary pressures. Black Americans
insistently made new demands on the state; the possibility that the black movement
would form an alliance with the anti-war movement was an added reason for conces-
sions (O'Connor, -1973b). The expansion of government social spending in the 1960's
benefitted countless other interest groups as well. For example, urban renewal
programs mainly gave benefits to non-black interest groups--building contractors,
central city land owners, savings and loan associations, and state workers. High
social and military spending produced budget deficits; opposition of conservatives
to social spending and leftists to military spending led to opposition to taxes
which worstened deficits and inflation (Lo, 1976).
One possible remedy for inflation was to reduce government spending. Sheer
numbers, combined with conservative priorities, pointed to emphasizing cuts in
military spending after the Korean War, and cuts in social spending after the Viet-
nam War. Social spending had risen more (and military spending had risen less) in
the Vietnam War compared to the Korean War. During the Korean War (between fiscal
year 1950 and 1953) social and economic spending rose by $1.2 billion (to $10.5
billion). (National Defense spending rose by $37.4 billion to $50.4 billion.) Dur-
ing the Vietnam War, (fiscal 1964 to 1968), social and economic spending rose by
.$14.7 billion (to $32.8 billion). (National defense spending rose by $26.6 billion
to $80.4 billion.) (Department of Defense, 1972: 192.) Military spending could be
cut after the Korean War because the war had successfully kept half of Korea in the
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U.S. oriented bloc.
Cutting social spending was a winning issue for Nixon, as was cutting military
and social spending for Eisenhower. Capitalizing on the backlash against black
riots of the late 1960's, Nixon criticized the Democratic partyts policy of social
spending, counterposing his own law and order approach. Boyd (1971) compared the
ability of different issues to account for Democratic party identifiers who did
not vote for Humphrey in 1968. The second largest defections occurred among people
feeling that riots should be met by "all available force to maintain law and order,"
instead of correcting "the problems of poverty and unemployment."
7
Edged on by Republican fiscal conservatives and neo-isolationists like Taft
and Hoover, Eisenhower promised to reduce government spending to $60 billion by
fiscal 1955, making possible tax reductions.8 The most decisive issue in the 1952
campaign was Eisenhower's promise that ending the long and expensive Korean War
would be the first priority of his administration.
The Republican Party was in a position to benefit from the issues of inflation
and budget cuts because of their past campaigning. The debate over the continuatio
of the New Deal in the immediate postwar period identified the Republican party as
the representative of popular discontent about high taxes, the mounting national
debt, and the large size of government budgets. During the Korean War, the right,
rather than the left, was able to make high military spending a campaign issue be-
cause of the previous Republican criticism of costly international commitments.
Their stands against the Democratic policies of preparedness for World Wars I and
II and excessive economic aid for Europe made the Republicans seem the group most
likely to reduce government spending for foreign affairs and the military.
9
Another source of conservatism is political stalemate. A political stalemate
is the inability of any group or coalition to mobilize sufficient popular support
behind a program to deal with a particular problem of capitalism. The simplest
form of political stalemate occurs when one political party proposes a solution to
a problem, and that solution is blocked by other political parties or popular groups
so that the state takes no action, or only ineffective action. This, we argue, was
the situation of the first Nixon administration, where the strategy of domestic
budget cuts was stalemated. Another version of political stalemate occurs when two
parties propose different solutions to a particular problem of capitalism. Each
political group has just enough strength to block the proposal of the other politi-
cal group, but neither has enough power to successfully implement its own proposal.
This second type of stalemate was exemplified by the politics of the Korean War,
where the Republican option of air and sea war with China stalemated the Democratic
option of continued, limited, land war in Korea and a negotiated settlement. The
most extreme form of political stalemate is a deadlock on all major issues. Poli-
tical parties fragment; no group is able to govern the country for more than a
short period. The Fourth French Republic is the best example of such an extreme
stalemate.
Political stalemate is most dangerous if it is combined with an economic or
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international crisis which compels a certain response which the political system
is unable to deliver. Then, political failings intensify crisis. This conjunction
between political stalemate and crisis occurred in each limited war.
Political stalemate, while primarily a problem from the point of view of the
capitalist class because it blocks needed policies, is also a problem for the pop-
ulation at large. The intensification of a crisis usually has detrimental conse-
quences for the people (such as inflation or a prolongation of casualities in a
war), which leads to popular resentment against politicians and the political sys-
tem. The conservative solution to political stalemate is to seek solutions to prob-
lems without gaining consent from the political parties. One means of achieving
this is the ascendency of a national hero, often a victorious general, who claims
to stand above the existing deadlocked politicians. The classic cases of such
heroes are Napoleon and Louis Bonaparte. Karl Marx (1869) analyzed the deadlock
of the French political parties in the 1840's and argued that their inability to
govern the country paved the way for the regime of Louis Bonaparte. Bonaparte
took advantage of the paralysis of government to make demagogic claims that he
would sweep the incompetent politicians aside, restore order to France, and embark
on a series of foreign adventures.
The national hero solution is conservative because it involves subordinating
the confusion of popular demands, interests, and competing political parties to a
president who can deal with the problems of capitalism. Occasionally, the national
heroes themselves explicitly argue the traditional elitist doctrine that the best
government is one in which the rulers are autonomous from popular pressures, and
are thus free to pursue the national interest instead of selfish group interests
or the petty whims of politicians. At the same time, conservative writers sound
the same theme, claiming that the ills of the society result from excessive popu-
lar demands on the government. In the United States, this view, once argued by
Schumpeter (1930), is again being emphasized in the report of the Trilateral Com-
mission (1975) and in the journal The Public Interest (1975).
All three limited wars intensified the already present tendencies toward poli-
tical stalemates. De Gaulle, Eisenhower, and Nixon made political stalemate a theme
in their campaigns, promising leadership above politics.
The Algerian War turned the stalemate of the Fourth French Republic into a
complete paralysis. The socialists, the radicals, and the MAP, the moderate par-
ties which had formed coalition governments during the Fourth Republic, were unable
to make any moves toward solving the pressing Algerian problem. The army and the
French settlers' political groups in Algeria would simply refuse to obey any mea-
sures leading to an independent Algeria. In the Algerian War, popular perceptions
of stalemate stemned not only from domestic French politics but also from the long,
indecisive nature of the conflict.
De Gaulle was chosen president during the Algerian crisis because he seemed
to offer an alternative to the political stalemate of the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle
was a national hero, symbolic to many Frenchof the resistance to Germany during
-47 -
World War II. Voters hoped his widespread popularity would produce effective ac-
tion. One of de Gaulle's favorite campaign tactics was to place two alternatives
before the voters--either a continuation of his rule or total chaos, which no other
individual or party could handle.
In the U.S. the underlying tendency toward political stalemate has been the
breakup of the New Deal Coalition. According to Burnham (1970) and Lubell (1956),
political stability in America depends upon a coalition, which is first formed in
a "critical" or "realigning" election such as the election of 1932. The develop-
ment of late capitalism has produced inflation and the fiscal crisis, which has
weakened the New Deal Coalition. Limits to deficit spending and the expansion of
state budgets meant that government benefits to any group in the coalition could
only be made at the expense of other groups. For example, welfare programs could
only be supported through taxation of the middle strata--the prosperous ethnic
groups, the suburbanized working class, and white collar workers. Thes groups,
once solidly affiliated with the Democrats, and still remembering the welcome re-
lief that the New Deal provided in the thirties, now also had an interest in the
anti-New Deal coalition, which promised to ease high taxes and inflation by reducing
social spending. As a result, the middle strata erratically shifted their support
between Democrats and Republicans. These shifts, combined with defections in the
South and the Midwest, weakened the New Deal Coalition and produced a stalemate.
The Presidency passed back and forth between the parties; often, opposing parties
controlled the White House and Congress.
10
The Korean War intensified and made more serious the deadlock between the two
political parties. Each political party vetoed the alternative of the other party.
The Democratic Party solution was to continue the ground war and negotiate a settle-
ment. Republicans remembered the political points they had scored by criticizing
the Yalta negotiations and the World War I peace settlement, and denounced the ad-
ministration for making excessive concessions to the treacherous communist negotia-
tors. According to the Republicans, the Democrats had not only failed to win a
war; they were losing the peace as well. If Truman settled the Korean War on the
same terms that Eisenhower eventually settled for, Republicans would have denounced
it as treason. (Ellsberg, 1972; Waltz, 1967).
The alternative of the right-wing Republicans was General MacArthur's plan for
a total military victory in Korea, by striking China with an invasion of Chiang
Kai-shek's army, a naval blockade, and U.S. air power, including nuclear weapons.
Although Truman administration spokesmen discredited most of Mac Arthur's proposals
during the Congressional hearings of spring and summer, 1951, the intense partisan
debate continued. Senator Jenner exclained, "this Government of ours [has been
turned] into a military dictatorship, run by Communist-appeasing, Communist-protect-
ing betrayer of America, Secretary of State Dean Acheson."1 1 Extremist rhetoric
led a horrified group of intellectuals to sound dire warnings about the danger of
the "radical right" in America (Bell, 1964).
Through his nonpartisan appeal, Eisenhower seemed to offer voters a relief from
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the partisan stalemate. Like de Gaulle, Eisenhower was a World War II hero stand-
ing above politics; some prominent Democrats sought to have Eisenhower as their
party's nominee for president.12
In the 1972 campaign, Nixon also stressed that he was president of all the
people, and was above politics. He gave the impression that he considered politi-
cal campaigning to be a distraction from the affairs of state. Nixon's attempt at
leadership above politics resulted from the need to reduce social spending. Nixon's
budget-cuts during his first administration generated opposition from the Democra-
tic Party, government bureaucracies, and special interest lobbies. Nixon had won
the Republican nomination in 1968 by gaining delegates through patiently conciliat-
ing and bargaining with special interests. In 1972, however, in order to reduce
domestic spending, Nixon needed a base of support that would not require pluralis-
tic concessions. Nixon's re-election campaign was run outside the normal channels
of the Republican Party. Nixon sought a sweeping electoral victory from a consti-
tuency, the silent majority, which would not make many political demands on his
administration.
Nixon's actions, intended to overcome a political stalemate, actually increased
it. The Watergate scandal and other relevations increased distrust of government
and politicians, and weakened political parties, thus making them even less able to
organize assent for policies needed by capitalism. Earlier in the seventies, voter
distrust seemed to be a left wing issue. Many of the injustices about domestic in-
telligence were first exposed by the radical left; the hostility against Nixon's
law and order advisors, and the stress of civil liberties in the Watergate investi-
gation seemed to point to an increased influence of the left. However, distrust
of government is also feeding the conservative sentiment for budget cuts in social
services as well as the leftist critique of American foreign policy and the military.
National Power
All political ideologies have called for national power, but to different de-
grees. The most vehement proponents were once conservatives; the lead shifted to
the corporate liberals by World War I but now is reverting back to the conservatives.
Around the turn of the century, conservatives were the leading advocates of over-
seas economic expansion and military power (Williams, 1962, 1969). Free market
ideology led conservatives to call for enlarging that market throughout the world;
military spending was small enough so that a hefty increase would not offend
laissez-faire sensibilities. But as gunboat diplomacy against minor powers was
replaced by total warfare among all the industrially advanced powers, the laissez-
faire conservatives in the U.S. became less enthusiastic about high military spend-
ing and governm'nt control over the economy that imperialism required. Industrial
capitalists, who had generally supported the Spanish American War and Open Door
diplomacy, were reluctant to rally behind the preparedness campaign before World
War II, because of their investments in Germany and their dislike of state regula-
tion, especially since it was led by President Roosevelt (Kolko, 1962; Bernstein,
1966). Before the Korean War, mainstream business sentiment called for reductions
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in the Marshall Plan and strict limits to the rise in military spending (Lo, 1975b):
In the United Stat(s, the primary support for the overseas expansion of U.S. econo-
mic and military power came from the corporate liberals. Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy
and Johnson pushed for corporate liberal reform at home and forged a centralized
state to further U.S. interests abroad.
Beginning with the Nixon Administration, however, conservatives began to aban-
don their hardened stand against all state intervention and supported an active
state in foreign affairs. This change in conservative ideology resulted from the
underlying shifts in great power alignments, which were further disrupted by limi-
ted wars.
During the Korean War, the change in the world balance of power stemmed from
tbc rising strength of the Sovict Union, China, and the left. Western Europe, the
major barrier to Soviet afluence before WKrid War IT, had been dcstroyed by the
war. In addition, United States power had been undermined by the rise of communist
governments in China, North Korca, and Eastern Europe, which made neutralism a more
attractive altcrnative to a military and economic alliance with the United States.
Although the Truman Administration spent huge amounts for a military buildup and
foreign aid, still, communist governments came to power.
The Korean War not only became the'symbol of foreign policy frustrations; it
also contributed to the weakening of U.S. power. Western Europe and the non-aligned
nations of Asia were critical of U.S. policy in Korea because of the excessive drain
on resources and the U.S. neglect of other problems; U.S. allies feared irrespon-
sible military actions. Hence, each year of the Korean War brought further tensions
in the system of U.S. centered alliances.
The conservatives Eisenhower and Dulles responded to the challenges to the
U.S. position by promising to reassert American power through a new policy of
"liberating" communist dominatedEastern Europe'and China. The Truman Administra-
tion's policy of containment,or restricting further Soviet gains, they claimed was
"defeatist" and "negative." However, the policies of the Eisenhower Administration
were more negative and defensive than Truman's, mainly because of Eisenhower's
other campaign promise in 1952--to reduce government spending. Eisenhower reduced
national defcnsc spending from 447.7 billion in fiscal 1953 to 138.4 billion in
fiscal 1956 (Department of Defense, 1972: 192).
As the communist challenge to U.S. power persisted, conservatives continued to
call for increased national power, but unlike Eisenhower, made tenative moves toward
supporting higher military spending. In 1968 Nixon continued the political rhetoric
about increasing national power, criticized the Democrats for squandering the Ameri-
can advantages in the Vietnam War, and claimed that the seizure of the Pueblo by a
"third rate military power" showed that U.S. power needed to be restored by the Re-
publicans. In the 1972 campaign, Nixon appeared to increase U.S. power by creating
the symbolic issue of safely returning the prisoners held by North Vietnam, and
then securing their release through bombing North Vietnam. In the 1972 elections,
Nixon defended high military spending from the attacks of George Mc Govern. The
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policies of President Ford complete the transition of conservatism into a position
that supports high military spending and remains opposed to state intervention to
regulate business, clean the environment, or increase social welfare. Ford pro-
posed a 4101 billion military budget for fiscal 1977 and planned to increase real
expenditures by 4% a year, reaching a level of $111 billion in fiscal 1981.13
Defending high military spending is easier for conservatives now that it in-
volves not the ambitious expansion of U.S. commitments, but rather a maintenance of
international privileges (such as low raw material prices and the use of the dollar
as the standard reserve currency) which have already proven to be a boom for capi-
tal. Defending high defense spending also fits into the conservative principle of
resisting popular demands, since the left of the Democratic Party, and a plurality
of the nation supports lower military budgets. According to the Gallup Poll, the
percentage of people thinking that the U.S. was spending too much for defense varied
from 49%, (315 favoring the same level, March 1971), slipped to 371 (40% favoring
the same, August, 1972), and rose to 46- (30% favoring the same, September, 1973).
Thus, conservatives reacted to the communist challenge by making inflated
patriotic demands to increase national power, and in addition, began to support
the substance of national power--high military spending. Another major change in
the world balance of power was the decline of the economic power of the United
States compared to Western Europe, exemplified by the decreasing competitiveness
of U.S. industries and an increase in the U.S. balance of payments deficit. Later,
we will discuss the U.S. response to this shift. Although American conservative
politicians did not try to make this decline into a campaign theme, de Gaulle made
it a winning political issue in France.
The same factors which necessitated a reassertion of U.S. power--a deadlock
between the Soviet Union and the United States and the U.S. balance of payments
deficit--gave France an opportunity to better her international standing. The
nuclear balance of terror between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and the stabilization
of relations between East and W st Europe meant that France could rely less on the
United States for her military defense and could instead play an independent role
in world affairs.
The increasing U.S. balance of payments deficit gave France the opportunity to
press for changes in the international monetary system which would strengthen France
and attack the privileged position of the U.S. Most countries had to devalue their
currency and induce recession if they ran a balance of payment deficit. However,
the U.S. deficit was tolerated because it supplied a flow of dollars abroad, needed
for international exchanges and reserves. De Gaulle criticized the U.S. deficit,
not only because the exemption from induced recession gave the U.S. an unfair ad-
vantage, but also because it caused inflation in Europe. France in the 1960's
sought to force the U.S. to end its deficit and to change the international reserve
currency from the dollar to either gold or a Composite Reserve Unit which would be
based in gold.14
The var in Algeria gave de Gaulle added reason to raise the issue of national
powcr. The Algerian War was the last in a series of long and violent struggles for
independence by France's colonies in Asia and Africa. Since France had to play a
less active rcl in the third world, the French military needed a new task in Europe;
otherwise, discontent in the Army would continue to lead to army interference in
French domestic politics.
15
De Gaulle made the restoration of French power a major theme in his political
campaigns. He enhanced his popularity through his resistance of American hegemony
in NATO and in the international monetary system, his veto of the English applica-
tion to the Common Market, his boycott of Common Market political activities in
1965-66, and other actions taken in the spirit of grandeur and independence. But
in addition to inflated rhetoric and symbolic political stands, de Gaulle embarked
on a major buildup of the French military. At first attempting to increase French
power in the structure of NATO, de Gaulle then withdrew from the organization when
it became clear that his proposals would be blocked by the United States. De Gaulle
announced an ambitious plan for making France an independent military power, which
called first for the d-velopmey of atomic weapons and strategic bombers, and then
the hydrogen bomb and missles.
Thus, amid the common conservative cry of increasing national power, Nixon,
Ford, and de Gaulle have been abandoning the laissez-faire conservative suspicion
about high military spending. National power stems not only from a military might
and diplomatic tenacity, but also from economic strength--rapid technological ad-
vance, high productivity of industry, price stability, and balance of payment sur-
pluses. The dedicated pursuit of the conservative goals of increasing national
economic power has led some conservatives to a drastic abandonment of laissez-faire
in favor of centralized executive power--the forte of yesterday's corporate liberals.
Executive Conservatism
In late capitalism, conservatives have been usually favored a very weak form
of centralization--effective administration within a government bureau. For example,
the Hoover Commission Report and other conservative proposals to reform the U.S.
military establishment stressed using standard business practices, increasing finan-
cial accountability to a central authority, coordinating procurement, eliminating
duplication, and lowering administrative overhead. Conservatives favor these pro-
posals as a means of reducing government spending (Hammond, 1961: 242, 312). This
weak form of centralization differs greatly from executive conservatism, which seeks
to impose a centrally planned, comprehensive policy on a number of different govern-
ment jurisdictions including executive bureaus and the legislature.
De Gaulle and Nixon, unlike Eisenhower, were executive conservatives. The Con-
stitution of the Fifth Republic, largely of Gaullist inspiration, increased the
powers of the President and the Prime Minister, particularly over the state budget.
Nixon also increased presidential power, through the erosion of the war-making and
budget-making powers of Congress, through the creation of the Domestic Council to
parallel the National Security Council, and by using hatchet men and personal ad-
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visors to control federal agencies (San Francisco Kapitalistate Group, 1975). Eisen-
hower, on the other hand, was not particularly interested in centralizing power.
The differences in centralizing can be traced to variations in two factors which
produced conservative politics--budget cuts and national power.
We first consider how differences in the need to restore national power can
explain differences in the Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations. By the time of
the Vietnam War, the U.S. position in the world had greatly deteriorated from the
Korean War period; a whole series of measures were needed to restore hegemony,
which necessitated executive centralization in the Nixon Administration.
During the Korean War, the economic position of the U.S. was quite favorable
compared to its competitors, communist or capitalist. Eisenhower merely had a nega-
tive task--ending the Korean War and high military budgets, which, if continued,
threatened to produce many of the same economic dislocations of the Vietnam War.
Between fiscal years 1950 and 1953, the U.S. spent around fifteen percent of gross
national product on the military, which included not only the costs of the Korean
War but also a world-wide rearmament program. But, beginning in 1952, policymakers
saw that many of the goals of the rearmament program could be postponed without ad-
versely affecting the world balance of power. And, once a certain level of military
strength had been achieved, it took less resources to maintain and modernize the
forces. Eisenhower's task was relatively uncomplicated; it was merely to cut back
military spending, thus allowing the consumer goods boom to continue. Since the
cut was accomplished through existing presidential powers, no executive centrali-
zation was needed.
After Korea, the international economic position of the United States steadily
deteriorated. Although reducing the U.S. effort in Vietnam helped to lessen the
deficit, further measures were needed to restore United States hegemony. The Nixon
Administration devalued the dollar, temporarily taxed imports, instituted wage and
price controls, subsidized investments, launched a campaign to increase exports,
and sought to increase East-West trade. Politically, the defeat of the United
States in Southeast Asia led to the policy of trying to maintain U.S. power in the
third world by using U.S. food supplies as a bargaining weapon and allowing rela-
tively stable, developed, and pro-American regimes such as Brazil and Taiwan to
play a more active military and economic role in the third world. Thus, the task
of restoring U.S. hegemony in the post-Vietnam period required a planned series of
economic policies, delicate negotiations with the Soviet Union, China, and the
other Western powers, and quick reactions to meet international crises. The accom-
plishment and coordination of these policies required the growth of executive power.
In addition, many of the policies needed to restore hegemony involved increasing
costs to workers and consumers. Reducing the cost of U.S. exports involved wage re-
straints; exports of grains to reduce the U.S. balance of payment deficit increased
food prices. The accomplishment of these policies required a strengthening of exe-
cutive power to prevent interference from domestic political pressures.
In the de Gaulle regime, increasing national power, specifically, raising the
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military budget at the expense of consumption and social services, led to the growth
of executive power. Meanwhile, higher demands for social services, particularly
education and social security, actually produced a decline in the percentage of the
state budget dcvoted to military spending in the Fourth Republic. 18
De Gaulle used the Fifth Republic's new budget-making powers to resist in-
creased social spending and to insure that the resources would be optimally used
within the military. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic reduced the power of
the Parliament over budgets. Amendments to the budget could only be made by the
Finance Committee rather than from the floor of the Parliament. The finance minis-
ter could refusc to allow votes on separate clauses of the budget bill; Parliament
was given at a time deadline to decide on the budget. A five-year plan for mili-
tary spending reduced the ability of Parliament to interfere with the expenditures
for any specific year.19
The final reason for the development of executive power in the aftermath of
the Vietnamese and Algerian Wars, but not the Korean War, is the seriousness of the
threats to the political order. Extremist political groups during the Vietnamese
and Algerian Wars challenged basic premises of foreign and domestic policy and re-
jected established channels of influence in favor of violent or otherwise illegal
means of protest. Government repression necessitated the growth of centralized
executive power.
During the Vietnamese War, fairly large sectors of the anti-war movement and
the black movement were willing to resort to non-established channels of protest
such as mass demonstrations, and illegal actions such as sit-ins. A small but
prominent tendency in the movement disobeyed draft laws, resorted to violence, and
questioned the basic premises of U.S. foreign policy--anti-communism, and dependent
relations between third world nations and the United States. The Algerian War pro-
duced threats from both the extreme right and the extreme left. The extreme right,
favoring a continuation of a French Algeria, refused to cooperate with plans for
independence, instigated several insurrections of the army in Algeria which threaten-
ed to spread to France, eventually resorted to a campaign of bombings and assassina-
tions. The communist party and other left groups critiqued France's colonial policy
and sponsored many demonstrations. A group of prominent communist-leaning intellec-
tuals signed the "Manifesto of the 121" encouraging soldiers to refuse to serve in
Algeria.
The challenge from the extreme left and the extreme right was met by executive
power, applied directly to the dissidents and more generally to a new foreign policy.
i Gaulle sought out and jailed dissenters from both extremes; he used executive
power to reorganize the army, giving honorific but powerless positions to his poli-
tical enemies.
There were also discrete but comprehensive purgings and postings
in the armed forces--so comprehensive, indeed, that it was said
that to know what was going on, one ought to follow the postings
of generals rather than the maneuvers of the parliamentary groups.
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.... "They no longer say 'so and so is going to abstain,'" but
'Trinquier has been sent south.'"
20
Many American social scientists have claimed that Mc Carthyism and other right-
wing tendencies during the Korean War were extremist movements, challenging the
basic policies of the Eastern elites and relying on new patterns of mobilization
and new channels of influence. Although the rhetoric of the right wing was extreme,
the right posed a far lesser threat to the political order than either left or
right in Vietnam or Algeria. MacArthur did disobey commands from Washington. How-
ever, the problem of civilian control of the army was never as severe as in the
Algerian War, and ceased to be a serious problem after MacArthur was replaced.
Practically all of the right-wing discontent about the Korean War and Truman's
economic policies was channeled through existing legal forms of political action--
lobbying of interest groups, the 1952 campaign of Taft and Eisenhower for the Presi-
dency, and Congressional actions to halt further tax increases and investigate the
dismissal of General MacArthur. In fact, as Michael Rogin (1967) points out, the
strength of the right did not derive from its ability to form new channels of pro-
test but rather from its connections to established centers of power. The left,
silenced by McCarthyism, was unable to critique U.S. policy; the right, while op.-
posing Truman's specific policies, still agreed with the necessity of military con-
frontation of the U.S.S.R., China, and the left.
Thus, the need to reassert national power, austerity, and threats from the ex-
treme right and the extreme left, produce executive centralization. But the need
for budget cuts that makes executive power necessary tends to limit it at the same
time. Limits on government spending prevent concessions to interest groups and
bureaucracies which are necessary compensations for the loss of their power to the
president. Centralization of executive power has usually been accompanied by an
increase in government spending. In the United States, higher spending and presi-
dential power characterized the New Deal, World Wars I and II, and the Truman and
Kennedy-Johnson Administrations. During the Vietnam War, presidential control over
bombing targets and the general conduct of war could only be obtained if the mili-
tary services were promised expanding budgets in return (Schurmann, 1974: 180-1).
There are few examples of executive centralization in a period of budgetary re-
straint rather than budget expansioi, the usual case. After World War II, plans
for the unification of the United States An;, Navy, and Air Force under a single
Department of Defense were justified to the public as a moans of reducing duplica-
tion and hence lowering military speanding. But intense bureaucratic conflict be-
tween the services over budget shares and strategic programs limited th:ir willing-
ness to cooperate in unification schemes. Nixon also attempted to increase execu-
tive power over domestic policy while at the same time restraining the increase of
government social spending. The opposition to both these policies, particularly
among liberal Democrats, found an outlet during the Watergate scandal.
Conclusion: The Fascist and Social Democratic Alternatives
We have seen how conservatives attempt to formulate plausible programs to deal
with the three major problems of late capitalism. Seeking popular acclaim without
conceding to public demands, conservatives reiterate some of their traditional solu-
tions--cutting social spending and providing leadership above politics. But the
problem of dealing with inter-imperialist rivalries has led conservatives to aban-
don strict laissez-faire and call for higher military spending and executive cen-
tralization to increase national power.
Although conservatives have gained popular favor by identifying and seeking to
remedy the problems of late capitalism, the conservative program is nothing more
than a short term remedy to the fiscal crisis, political stalemate, and inter-im-
perialist rivalry. Budget cuts are at best a temporary solution to fiscal crisis,
since there are limits to how much the budget can be cut. As OtConnor (1973a) points
out, much government spending is essential for the expansion of capitalism. The
state budget subsidizes the cost of capital and the consumption of the working
class, thus lowering costs for business. "Social expenses" are necessary to contain
dissent. In addition, specific capitalist interests oppose budget cuts in expen-
ditures that benefit themselves.
The conservative call for leadership above politics is also a fictitious solu-
tion. As the case of Richard Nixon shows, the campaign rhetoric of the national in-
terest often hides corruption, the use of the state for partisan advantage, and
deals with special interest groups. Leadership above politics assumes that there
is a consensus for a national goal. We have seen however, that the conservatives
do not represnt the interest of society but support the interest of capitalism
(Kolko, 1968: 64-98; San Francisco Kapitalistate Group, 1974).
The conservative rhetoric about national power is the most specious of all.
The Gaullist and Eisenhower-Dulles promises to increases national power were wildly
exaggerated. Eisenhower and Dulles pledged to increase national power not through
material means but by acting "tougher" with the communists.21 But actually, the
declining position of the U.S. resulted not from the softness of the previous ad-
ministration but from long term changes. Standing up to the communists cannot in-
crease national power. Only increases in military spending, improving productivity,
and controlling inflation might have a real impact, but an uncertain impact at best,
depending on the reactions of other states. But each of these actions requires
sacrifices by the working class: high taxes, cuts in the non-military budget, lower
wages. The conservative alternative would have a much lower popularity among the
working class if it were made clear who would pay for the conservative's chauvanism.
Although conservatism has developed short term responses to crises, it has
never found a method of establishing a more permanent social order in times of cri-
sis. Conservatism claims that order results from the natural processes of society--
the hierarchial communities of aristocratic conservatism, and the self-regulating
market of laissez-faire conservatism. Conservatism works best in a period of so-
cial stability, when the social order needs not reconstruction, but only praise.
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However conservatism is most needed in a period of popular challenge against the
state. But its program for social stability--community and market--is bankrupt
because both have been undermined by the capitalist development that conservatism
supports as well. Conservatism's only program for order is the resistance to popu-
lar demands, which has incited revolution as often as it has created submission
(Kissinger, 1954).
Political ideologies other than conservatism have also attempted to develop
programs relevant to the problems of late capitalism. The same factors which pro-
duce conservatism--austerity, stalemate, and national power--when intensified, can
also produce fascism. Restoring Germany to a position of world power after the
defeat of World War I was a major theme in Nazi propaganda. Karl Polanyi (1957)
tracts the rise of fascism to the political stalemate between labor and capital,
and to the restrictions on pDpular opposition that accompanied austerity programs
to defend the gold standard in the 1920's.
Fascism, however, differs from conservatism because it is the active mobili-
zation for the creation of a new order, whereas conservatism is the passive support
for the maintenance of the existing order. Thus, while fascism required a high
level of popular commitment to new policies, the politicization behind Eisenhower,
Nixon, and de Geulle was obviously less intense. Nixon's political base was an
otherwise inactive constituency--the silent majority. Those who voted for risen-
hower were in no mood for a new order--the 1950's were to be an era of normalacy
and consumption.
Another alternative to conservatism is social-democracy, which is based in
the working class and seeks the improvement of popular conditions in a way compatible
with the continuation of capitalism. The non-communist leadership of the U.S. and
European labor movements and the U.S. civil rights movement were social democratic.
One possible response of social democracy to the crisis of limited war is a mimicry
of the conservative stands of budget cuts, leadership above politics, and national
power. Examples abound of social democrats following the lead of the conservatives
in the name of the national interest. The social democratic parties of Europe sup-
ported budget cuts and austerity to defend the gold standard and voted war credits
on the eve of World War I. Presently, the English Labour Party is trimming the
welfare state that it struggled for decades to create (Guttman, 1976); the stands
of other social-democratic political parties throughout the world became less dis-
tinguishable from the conservatives. Just as Democrats and Republicans in the
1950's competed iver which party was more anti-communist, politicians today compete
over who can more effectively lower social spending. In this competition over
means, social democrats have an advantage because they are mire likely than conser-
vatives to obtain the support of the labor movement and ither popular groups. How-
ever, since social democrats arc more subject to popular pressures, they will be
less able to mike the large cuts that capitalism might require in the future.
The second major reaction of social democrats is to continue tocall for the
lim - honored program of expanding government social spmnding and job creation.
This strategy, howevvr, c-)mits a major sin of omission. By failing to advocate
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adequate government controls over business such as effective price controls, allo-
cation of investment, and regulation of multinational corporations, the strategy
causes some sections of the working class to pay for the benefits of other sec-
tions (Andersen, 1976). In the current economic crisis, social welfare without
government controls merely produces inflation, slow investment, and high taxes for
the working class. Conservatives will continue to stress these problems and will
blame them on the social-democrats' policies, resulting in less popular support
for the original goals of social spending and full employment.
Thus, the first alternative is to abandon social-democratic goals; the second
rests on the false belief that the goals can be achieved without controlling cor-
porate power. The third alternative is to recognize that in a period of capital-
ist crisis and decline, popular demands and capitalism are becoming increasingly
incompatible, and that the fulfillment of popular demands requires the abandonment
of capitalism.
FOOTNOTES:
1. The American forerunner of executive conservatism is Alexander Hamilton.
Cf. the arguments of Wolin, 1976, who considers the Hamiltonian notion of a
strong state to be integral to the conservative tradition. Our treatment of
Hamiltonian conservatism follows Rossiter, 1962: 108-10.
2. Polanyi, 1957, reminds us that the conservatives rightly saw that it was a
uptopian experiment to trust self regulating markets to produce social order.
For a similar argument that capitalists are unable to provide social, politi-
cal, and ideological order see Schumpeter, 1950: 121-163.
3. According to the typology developed here, Kolko's The Triumphof Conservatism
actually describes the triumph of corporate liberalism.
4. We differ from OtConnor's (1973a) view that the "social industrial complex",
an ambitious program of government spending to employ the surplus population
and make monopoly capital more productive, is a viable solution to the fiscal
crisis of the state. O'Connor and Offe point out that it is difficult to
organize state activity to make capital more productive, because there are
no clear criteria in the state sector which would be equivalent to the pro-
fitability criteria in the private sector. Thus, it is likely that the ex-
pansion of social spending would be a further drain on revenues instead of
increasing them in the long run.
5. U.S. News and World Report, January 4, 1952, pp. 52-53, April 25, 1952, p. 77.
6. For a concerned corporate liberal response, see Comittee for Economic
Development, 1952. The actual deficit was $6.5 billion.
7. During Nixon's presidency, between fiscal years 1968 and 1974, non-military
spending as a parcent of GNP rose slower than during the Johnson administra-
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tion (fiscal 1965-1968). Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1975, p. 225.
Military spending declined as a percentage of GNP in the Nixon years.
8. Patterson, 1972: 574.
9. Westerfield, 1935. See Converse, 1934 for data on popular perceptions of the
differences in the two parties.
10. Lubell, 1956a, 1956b.
11. Acheson, 1969: 365.
12. During the 1952 campaign, Eisenhower criticized both the Democrats' limited
war policy and the demands of right wing Republicans for escalation of the
Korean War. However, once in office, Eisenhower adopted some of the policies
suggested by the right wing Republicans. Eisenhower announced that the U.S.
Seventh Fleet would no longer prevent Chiang kai-shek from invading mainland
China. Eisenhower threatened new forms of retaliation if the peace was not
satisfactorily negotiated. Caridi, 1968.
13. The New York Times, May 23, 1976, section 3, p. 1.
14. See Block, 1975 for an extended discussion of the international political
issues involved in managing the U.S. deficit.
15. Furniss, 1964 and Kolodziej, 1974: 164.
16. See Kolodziej, 1972 for international economic policy and Aron, 1965 and
Kolodziej, 1974: 96-112 for rearmament.
17. Flash, 1965: 90-5 and Snyder, 1962: 383-524.
18. Morse, 1973.
19. Williams and Harrison, 1971: 173-235 and Pickels, 1960: 112-144.
20. The general use of executive power to accomplish a new foreign policy helped
to solve the problem of order in France. The French Communist Party approved
de Gaulle's policy of detente with the Soviet Union and his opposition to
European political integration, NATO, and U.S. economic hegemony. The PCF
was thus unwilling to actively work to form a coalition to replace de Gaulle.
21. In the struggle against communism, Dulles and Eisenhower stressed the use of
moral weapons, the most tangible of which was propaganda. In a strange twist
of cold war logic, reliance on material weapons such as military spending and
foreign aid was denounced as succumbing to a materialist theory of human be-
havior characteristic of the communists.
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